if Australia is threatened. Not only is it dif cult to envisage the circumstance in which such an insurance policy might be utilised, but even if it were, its redemption is unlikely to be determined solely by Australia's earlier investments in the relationship. In the meantime, though, as even conservative commentators have pointed out (Fraser 2000) , Australia nds itself enmeshed in a destabilising, unproven defence system that is principally designed to protect America, and which may make Australia's relations with the region even more problematic than they already are (Beeson 2000:38) .
Whatever the strategic merits of the US alliance may be, it has an added symbolic importance in the current debate. The relationship with the US, like the whole seemingly pre-empted question of defence spending more generally, is illustrative of the way some elements of Australia's defence policy are simply not negotiable. Despite the invitation to debate, some policies are clearly sacrosanct, enjoy bilateral support and are unlikely to be affected by the current review. Yet while there may still be an argument for Australia retaining some modest military capacity to deal with illegal immigrants and shers, terrorists or the like, there seems less and less justi cation for maintaining more substantial forces. There are a number of compelling forces at work in the contemporary international system that justify this assertion, and a number of key consequences that ow from them.
The new international order
The world no longer works in the way it once did. Some of the supposedly 'timeless' assumptions about states and their behaviour are becoming increasingly untenable. One of the most important trends of recent times, especially since the end of the Cold War, has been a general shift from 'geo-politics' to 'geo-economics' (Luttwak 1990) . Economic development has become a more critical determinant of national power and welfare, and consequently a more important focus of policy attention. Underpinning this shift has been a more fundamental transformation in the underlying logic and potential ef cacy of military expansion and conquest. Before the Second World War, for example, it may actually have made some sort of sense-from the perspective of Japan's militarily dominated government, at least-to invade Southeast Asia and secure access to vital resources threatened by the US's containment policies. These days, however, Japan is a classic example of a new sort of state, one that uses corporate power and foreign investment to gain control over the very same resources it once attempted to secure through military means (Rosecrance 1986 ).
There has been a secular transformation in the underlying logic of the global political economy which the Green Paper acknowledges, but to which it gives scant consideration. Simply put, within the democratically ordered, industrialised world, economic power and development have become far more important to states than have conventional security issues.
1 Indeed, the very de nition of security now has a crucial economic and even environmental dimension that is transforming the way security issues are conceived and the way inter-state relations are conducted as a consequence (Buzan et al. 1998; Beeson 1999) .
The European Union is the most advanced expression of this logic. As a consequence of greater political and economic interaction, it is now quite simply unthinkable that the countries of Western Europe could go to war with each other. Long-standing foes like Germany and France are, in fact, the backbone and drivers of a continuing process of integration that makes issues of national defence and sovereignty increasingly anachronistic.
The key point here is that it no longer makes sense in the way it once did to expect any bene ts to accrue from the forcible invasion of another developed and wealthy territory. Not only would valuable and complex infrastructure on both sides of any con ict be destroyed, but even any physical assets which survived this process would be less valuable than they once were. In an era of the so-called knowledge economy (Drucker 1993 ), a would-be conqueror must rstly stop the most skilled and wealth-generating elements of the population eeing, and then bend them to his (surely women are too wise for this) will.
In short, the much invoked forces of 'globalisation' in general and economic integration in particular seem to be making warfare, at least within the rich world, increasingly unlikely. Oddly, policymakers have been slow to pick up on or exploit this potentially positive aspect to the increasingly resisted and reviled idea of globalisation. But if the pervasive logic of liberal capitalism is followed to its conclusion, there are powerful reasons to suppose that it might help legitimate globalisation while shoring up the embattled state's scal position.
Extending the logic of neoliberalism
Within the Anglo-American economies, the last few decades have been marked by a sustained attempt to institutionalise market mechanisms in every sphere of economic and social activity. In Australia, governments of both political persuasions have placed neoliberal, market-centred initiatives and ideas at the centre of public policy (Beeson and Firth 1998) -with the noteworthy and glaring exception of national defence. And yet if governments take the underlying logic and dynamic of market-centred liberalism seriously, and abide by the concomitant imperative to reduce government involvement in the provision of public services and goods wherever possible, a more radical but philosophically consistent solution to Australia's security dilemma and the increasingly unaffordable expenditure it entails presents itself: defence, too, could be outsourced.
At a time when conventional military threats have become unimaginable, the justi cation for each nation maintaining a signi cant and ruinously expensive capacity to deal with a threat that will almost certainly never arise is increasingly dif cult to justify. In this context the much derided-at least by Australia and the US-New Zealand model, which is based on reduced expenditure and the development of a more 'appropriate' military force, is an example Australia could well copy rather than castigate. It is not at all obvious that New Zealand is a less secure place now than it was when it was a more integral part of the ANZUS alliance and more heavily reliant on the US for its security. On the other hand, New Zealand's ability to conduct an independent foreign policy, and establish closer and more effective international and regional relations, has been enhanced (Thakur and Maley 2000) .
Yet handing responsibility for national defence to the private sector is an unrealistic and unsettling prospect. Whether it is any wiser to entrench a single country at the apex of an international security system and then hope that its interests will coincide with Australia's is equally problematic. For all its well-known problems and dif culties (see Falk 1999) , a more enduring solution might be to make the United Nations responsible for guaranteeing international and national security.
Unrealisable and utopian as such an idea might seem at present, making the UN responsible for international security has a number of key potential advantages. First and most importantly, individual states would have a greatly reduced necessity for individual defence spending, promoting a virtuous circle which further reduces existing 'security dilemmas'. Indeed, a really creative response to making the UN a more nancially secure and independent body capable of such a role, might be to raise some of the funds through a tax on international capital movements, 2 thus helping to stabilise the fragile international nancial system as well.
If the UN did have an independent military capacity with which to pursue peacekeeping and, if necessary, peacemaking activities, it would also have the great bene t of de-politicising the sorts of operations Australia recently undertook in Timor. In the longer term a UN military capacity in which members had con dence might even help to wind back the seemingly inexorable spread of nuclear weapons. Surely these are desirable goals if achievable.
Concluding remarks
Are such ideas, however, simply the unrealistic pipe-dreams of the strategically illiterate? Perhaps. But who would have thought that the nations of Western Europe would seriously contemplate developing a collective army (Medley 1999) ? Who would have believed that so many countries would come to have completely undefended and 'open' borders? Indeed, who would have imagined that the bipolar order that characterised the Cold War for more than 50 years would be swept away in a moment? Certainly not the generations of strategic 'experts' who advised governments where to spend public money.
If the Howard Government's 'debate' is to amount to more than an arcane discussion about the relative technical merits of expensive military hardware, alternative ideas need to be, if not taken seriously, then at least more convincingly repudiated. The onus should be on those who wish to spend money on warfare rather than welfare to defend such priorities and to identify precisely the threats that justify them. Given Australia's woeful performance in what seem to be increasingly important knowledge-related activities (Goldsworthy 1997) , we need to ask collectively whether we can afford to spend some $13 billion a year on a potential threat that even the Government's own experts concede they cannot identify.
Australia's unique natural advantages and the increasingly remote prospect of a direct military threat to this country mean that Australia could exploit its benign strategic environment. Not only might signi cantly decreased military expenditure produce immediate returns in terms of the budget bottom line and potentially better regional relations, but it might also serve as a powerful exemplar of the bene ts that accrue from a less militaristic 'posture'. After all, if Australia cannot take advantage of the new international order and break free of the old paradigm, who can?
